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"QUICK-TAKE" CONDEMNATION
evidence should be meticulously introduced and carefully incorporated into
a properly framed hypothetical question, designed to elicit carefully phrased
opinions from witnesses.
JOHN M. METZGER
North Carolina Eminent Domain-Consitutional
Challenges to Chapter 506 of the North Carolina Session
Laws of 1967: "Quicktake" Condemnation
INTRODUCTION
The eminent domain law of North Carolina is a complex and often
confusing collection of statutes that have been enacted one on top of another
with little, if any, consideration for the impact on the existing body of law.'
This oft-cited critical pronouncement of North Carolina Eminent Domain
law sets the stage for the analysis contained herein.
The present array of "granting law," authorizes more than seventy
condemnors to condemn property, and the composite of "procedural law"
includes over eighteen separate procedures for effectuating the grant of
condemnation authority. Condemnees, attorneys and even judges, often-
times evince uncertainty and confusion both about the nature of the authority
and the scope of the application of procedures used in exercise of the
authority. Pronouncements of the North Carolina Supreme Court may apply
to one procedure but not to another, thus inevitable confusion results when
courts must interpret different procedures. In turn, the landowner must
prepare to defend, if necessary, against the taking of his property amongst a
myriad of procedures-some affording greater protection of the owner's
property interests than others.
Inherent in the condemnation process is the conflict between the protec-
tion of the owner's property rights and the public's need for administrative
convenience and expedience. Thus, the proliferation of different procedures
is largely a reflection of dissimilar judgments as to what is more important in
a specific type of condemnation, 2 protection of personal property or ad-
ministrative expedience. When the totality of circumstances indicates that a
particular procedure reflects administrative convenience as the prevailing
1. Phay, The Eminent Domain Procedure of North Carolina: The Need For Legislative
Action, 45 N.C.L. REV. 587 (1967).
2. Id. at 589.
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consideration for its application, without regard for the underlying purpose
of the taking, the question becomes whether such procedure, in giving
preferential consideration to convenience, is so inconsiderate of the rights of
the property owner as to deny him the full measure of constitutional due
process of law. This situation has arisen in the application of Chapter 5063
of the 1967 Session Laws of North Carolina (hereinafter referred to as
Chapter 506), which is drawn upon the condemnation procedure of Article 9
of Chapter 136 of the North Carolina General Statutes.
This writing focuses on the viability of constitutional challenges incident
to the operation of Chapter 506 procedures, as contained in Article 9 of
Chapter 136, and referred to, in the vernacular, as "quick-take" condemna-
tion.
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Chapter 136 of the North Carolina General Statutes, Roads and High-
ways, grants the North Carolina Board of Transportation the power of
condemnation 4 and sets out the purposes for which the power may be
exercised:
[T]o acquire such land . . . as it may deem necessary and suitable
for road construction, maintenance and repair, and the necessary
approaches and ways through, and a sufficient amount of land
surrounding and adjacent thereto, as it may determine to enable it to
properly prosecute the work, either by purchase, donation, or con-
demnation, in the manner hereinafter set out. 5
Article 9 of Chapter 136 establishes the procedure by which the power may
be exercised.6
The focus of constitutional attack upon any deprivation of property or
property interest is leveled, ordinarily, at the procedural prescriptions affect-
ing title and possession. Due process generally guarantees, to one who is
being deprived of a substantial property interest, an opportunity to be heard
before he is finally divested of his interest. In condemnation proceedings,
that process which is due relates to the availability of procedural safeguards
afforded the condemnee, prior to the deprivation of his property interest.
Courts agree that notice and opportunity to be heard apply to condemna-
tions. The question for the North Carolina challenger-condemnee is when
these safeguards must apply-before or after divestment of title and posses-
3. "An Act to amend G.S. 160-205 so as to authorize municipalities to use the procedure
provided in Article 9 of Chapter 136 of the General Statutes as specifically authorized by G.S.
136-66(3)(c) in acquiring lands, easements, privileges, rights of way and other interests for
public purposes in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, and providing that this act shall
apply only to the City of Durham."
4. See generally, N.C. GEN. STAT. Chapter 136, Article 1 (1976).
5. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-19 (1974).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 136-103 through 136-121 (1974).
2
North Carolina Central Law Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 [1977], Art. 8
https://archives.law.nccu.edu/ncclr/vol8/iss2/8
"QUICK-TAKE" CONDEMNATION
sion-in order to afford him procedural due process of law. Condemnation
procedures for the same or similar condemnors provide for both situations,
in North Carolina.
Chapter 506 authorizes the immediate vesting of title and right to posses-
sion of condemned property, in the City of Durham, upon the filing of the
complaint and the declaration of taking, and the cash deposit in court of the
estimated compensation. 7 Before the enactment of Chapter 506, a Durham
condemnee's title was divested by decree, in a special proceeding under
Article 2 of Chapter 40 of the North Carolina General Statutes.8 Complete
divestment was effected only after fair compensation had been ascertained
and paid, as directed by final decree confirming the award.9 The majority of
North Carolina municipalities and counties having the authority to condemn
private property for public purposes are not empowered to use the procedure
authorized by Chapter 506. Thus, it is possible for two North Carolina
condemnees to receive varying procedural protections, based not upon a
difference of circumstance, but upon their municipal residence.
The purpose for which property is sought-purpose being viewed ordi-
narily as one of the factors that distinguishes between condemnors-normal-
ly is reflected in the procedure authorized for condemnation. The purposes
for which the Board of Transportation may seek to exercise its power are
usually thought of as those of necessity, i.e., to condemn principally for
highway construction, maintenance, safety and development. And, the
provisions of N.C. Gen. STAT. § 136-103 reflects the urgency of the need
for title and possession.
The procedure authorized by Article 9 of Chapter 136, by special amend-
ment, has been made available to other municipalities and counties seeking
to make their condemnation procedure less onerous and time consuming
than that authorized by the general law. 10 Chapter 506 grants to the City of
Durham the authority to use the procedural provisions of Article 9 of
Chapter 136 "for any acquisition of lands, easements, privileges . . . for
any and all public purposes in the exercise of the power of eminent domain
. . . without being limited to streets constituting a part of the State highway
system."l" Chapter 506 adds to the existing condemnation authority and
procedure of Chapter 160A, which also provides a similar condemnation
7. City of Kings Mountain v. Goforth, 283 N.C. 316, 196 S.E.2d 321 (1973).
8. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 40-11 et seq. Authority for divestment of title contained
specifically in § 40-19.
9. The title of the landowner, under a Chapter 40 condemnation, is not divested unless and
until the condemnor obtains a final judgment in his favor and pays the landowner the amount of
damages fixed by such final judgment. See City of Kings Mountain v. Goforth, 283 N.C. 316,
1% S.E.2d 231 (1973); Highway Comm'n v. York Industrial Center, Inc., 263 N.C. 230, 139
S.E.2d 253 (1964); Topping v. State Board of Education, 249 N.C. 291, 106 S.E.2d 502 (1959).
10. See, e.g., Chapter 784, 1973 Session Laws of North Carolina, amending the Greens-
boro City Charter to authorize the City of Greensboro to use the procedure of Article 9 of
Chapter 136 as an alternate condemnation procedure.
11. See generally, Chap. 506, 1967 N.C. Sess. Laws.
3
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procedure for municipalities and public corporations as that contained in
Article 9 of Chapter 136. 12 Chapter 160A procedure adds to the procedure of
Article 2 of Chapter 40, and any other procedures authorized by municipal
charter or local act.' 3
Prior to the enactment of Article 9 of Chapter 136, the procedure of
Article 2 of Chapter 40 was applicable to condemnation proceedings in-
stituted by the Board of Transportation, 14 as well as to proceedings instituted
by North Carolina municipalities. As the law stands to date, in exercising
the power of eminent domain, a city may in its discretion use the procedure
of Article 2 of Chapter 40, or the procedure of Article 160A, or the
procedure of any other general law, charter or local act applicable to the
city. 1 5
Given the procedures authorized by general legislation for public and
private corporations, the grant by local act of Article 9 Chapter 136 proce-
dure to the City of Durham for any and all purposes seemingly defies any
consideration of necessity of purpose or urgency for immediate possession
of, and title to, private property.
What constitutional problems has the myriad of condemnation procedures
brought to the Durham challenger-condemnee? In the recent case of City of
Durham v. Manson,16 the City of Durham applied Article 9 Chapter 136
procedure, authority as granted by Chapter 506, to condemn the Mansons'
property for the purpose of establishing a municipal park. Defendants
asserted, inter alia, that the exercise of eminent domain denied them the
equal protection and procedural due process of law, guaranteed by the
United States and North Carolina Constitutions. They contended that the
condemnor, by the authority of Chapter 506, acquired title to and immediate
possession of Defendants' land without notice and a prior hearing on the
question of the expedience and necessity of the taking. Defendants asserted
the applicability of the "modern" standards of due process, as developed
through Sniadach v. Family Finance Corporation17 and Fuentes v. She-
vin. 18 The trial court reserved the decision on the merits of the constitution-
ality of Chapter 506, because there was a nonconstitutional ground for
settling the issue. The court of appeals declared Chapter 506 constitutional.
On appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, the ruling of the court of
12. The power of eminent domain is conferred upon each North Carolina city for all
purposes set out in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-241 (1976). Procedures controlling the exercise of
the power are referenced in Article 11 of Chapter 160A.
13. 1971 N.C. Sess. Laws chap. 698 s. 1.
14. City of Kings Mountain v. Goforth, 283 N.C. 316, 196 S.E.2d 231 (1973).
15. N.C. Sess. Laws: 1917, chap. 136, sub-chap. 4, § 1; 1919, chap. 262; C.S., §§ 2791,
2792; 1923, chap. 181; 1961, chap. 982; 1971, chap. 698, § 1.
16. 21 N.C. App. 161, 204 S.E.2d 41 (1973). Case heard on appeal to the North Carolina
Supreme Court, but constitutional question undecided. Held: constitutional question improper-
ly before court of appeals, thus, improperly decided. 285 N.C. 741, 208 S.E.2d 662 (1974).
17. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
18. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
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appeals on the constitutional question was assigned as error, the question
having been improperly before the court. The constitutionality of Chapter
506 was asserted by the City of Durham, on appeal, but was not specifically
raised as an exception, and was not briefed for the court of appeals. Thus,
the particular constitutional issue presented by the Manson defendants has
not, as of this writing, been settled by the North Carolina Supreme Court.
The Manson defendants argued that the Sniadach-Fuentes'9 line of cases
constitutionally foreclosed the City of Durham from acquiring property for
all public purposes, pursuant to the authority of Chapter 506, since no
provision was made for prior notice or an opportunity to be heard with
respect to the necessity, extent or expedience of the taking, and before
defendants were finally deprived of both title and possession of their proper-
ty. Such procedural safeguards, as argued by defendants, are mandated by
both the United States and North Carolina Constitutions.
North Carolina case law has spoken to the constitutionality of the state's
general laws of condemnation. It is uncontested that the constitutional
requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard apply to condemnation
proceedings.20 But, until Manson, no North Carolina court had spoken
directly to the constitutionality of the procedure of Article 9 of Chapter
136-to which Chapter 506 refers-as applied, without a showing or impli-
cation of an urgent purpose or compelling need to condemn the land
quickly. This is the focal point of the argument raised in Manson, i.e.,
because the City of Durham could show no compelling need to condemn the
land quickly, due process required that the Mansons be afforded a prior
public-purpose hearing before they were finally divested of title and posses-
sion to their property. Query, whether taking private property for park
purposes carries with it the same necessity for expedience as a taking for the
construction of streets and highways, so as to justify the application of
Article 9 Chapter 136 procedure thereto.
The North Carolina Supreme Court, in a Chapter 40 condemnation, has
held that "[T]he due process clause is not violated by failure to give the
owner of property an opportunity to be heard as to the necessity and extent
of appropriating his property to public use, but it is essential to due process
that the mode of determining the compensation to be paid for the appropria-
tion be such as to afford the owner an opportunity to be heard."- 2 1 The
United States Supreme Court has held, in Bragg v. Weaver, 22 that the
necessity and expediency of the taking of property for public use are
legislative questions, no matter who may be charged with their decision, and
19. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 635 (1971); Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
20. Randleman v. Hinshaw, 267 N.C. 136, 147 S.E.2d 902 (1966).
21. Browning v. Highway Comm'n, 263 N.C. 130, 138, 139 S.E.2d 227 (1964).
22. 251 U.S. 57 (1919).
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a hearing thereon is not essential to due process, in the sense of the
fourteenth amendment. Where adequate provision is made by a state for the
certain payment of the compensation, without unreasonable delay, the
taking does not contravene due process of law merely because it precedes
the ascertainment of what compensation is just.
23
The procedure of Article 2 of Chapter 40, as noted previously, affords
different procedural safeguards to the condemnee than does the procedure of
Chapter 506. In Airport Authority v. Irving,24 a Chapter 40 condemnation,
the court recognized the confusion existing in North Carolina condemnation
case law regarding procedural rights. Principally, confusion steemed from
the court's failure to distinguish cases where compensation is the only issue
from cases where the legitimacy of the act of taking itself is questionable.
25
In Chapter 40 condemnations all questions of fact and law are required to be
settled prior to the determination of just compensation. The effect of this
procedure is to permit the parties to settle all preliminary questions, con-
cerning the legitimacy of the taking, before the condemnor enters upon the
condemned property with full right to title and possession.2 6 The Manson
defendants cited Irving dicta in support of the proposition that this same
procedural assurance, afforded by Article 2 of Chapter 40, is also applicable
to Chapter 506 proceedings. The Irving court recognized, however, that
Article 9 of Chapter 136 and Chapter 160 (now revised in Chapter 160A)
placed grantees of that condemnation authority, with respect to the vesting of
title in and unfettered possession property, "in a different category from
other agencies and corporations having the right of eminent domain."
27
Whereas in Chapter 40 the right to condemn, if at issue, was settled prior to
vesting of title and possession in the condemnor, under Chapter 506 the
property owner must institute a collateral proceeding to receive judicial
adjudication of the right to condemn private property. 28 In a Chapter 506
condemnation the court may issue a restraining order denying possession or
divesting the condemnor of possession physically taken, pending appeal.29
The effect of a judgment that the condemnation was not a proper exercise of
the power of eminent domain is to revest the property in the property owner
23. See Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U.S. 203 (1945); Joslin Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 U.S.
668 (1923); Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700 (1923); Bragg v. Weaver, 251 U.S.
57 (1919); Sears v. Akron, 246 U.S. 242 (1918); Backus v. Fort Street Union Depot Co., 169
U.S. 557 (1898); Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380 (1895).
24. 2 N.C. App. 341, 163 S.E.2d 118 (1968).
25. Id. at 343.
26. See nn.8-9 supra.
27. Airport Authority v. Irving, 2 N.C. App. 341, 345, 163 S.E.2d 118 (1968).
28. Chapter 136 vests title in the condemnor immediately upon the filing of the complaint,
declaration of taking and notice of deposit. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-104 (1974). However, if
the condemnee challenges the validity of the taking, or asserts an exercise of condemnation
authority in excess of that conferred by statute, Chapter 506 does not provide statutory
recourse against the condemnor under any circumstances.
29. Highway Comm'n v. Batts, 265 N.C. 346, 144 S.E.2d 126 (1965).
6
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with the improvements, if any, thereon. 30 No provision is made for restoring
the character of property wrongfully taken, taken in excess of statutory
authority or taken for an improper purpose, if the "improvement" impairs
the use of the land to the owner. Note, too, that there is no right to recover
from the condemnor damages for the trespass that was initially predicated
upon the exercise of authority conferred by Chapter 506.31 There would
seem to be a cause of action for trespass against those persons or entities
who actually committed the trespass. 32 But, the North Carolina courts have
not spoken affirmatively on this point.
Chapter 506 does provide for judicial determination of questions prelimi-
nary to the determination of the amount to be paid. However, such determi-
nations ordinarily are limited to circumstances wherein the taking is con-
ceded, not contested. 33
Juxtaposition of Chapter 40 Article 2 procedure and Chapter 136 Article 9
procedure readily reveals the absence, in Article 9, of several procedural
safeguards which appear in Article 2 of Chapter 40. Notwithstanding the
differences reflected in the time of vesting of title and possession in the
condemnor, another significant difference in the two procedures is the
Chapter 40 requirement of prior efforts to negotiate by purchase, before
instituting a taking. 34 Article 9 does not impose this requirement upon the
condemnor. 35 These procedural dispartities tend to signify an attenuation of
procedural safeguards for the Chapter 506 condemnee, and further beclouds
what should be general condemnation law.
A recent federal case, Joiner v. City of Dallas ,36 has upheld the right of
condemnors to acquire title to and immediate possession of land without
notice and a prior hearing. The Joiner defendants, as in Manson, argued
that the statutory power possessed by the City of Dallas, to enter upon and
take possession of property prior to an adjudication of the right to condem-
nation, violated "modern" standards of due process, as developed through
the Sniadach-Fuentes reasoning. The Sniadach-Fuentes line of cases stand,
generally, for the proposition that one cannot be divested of title in and right
to possession of personal property upon the ex parte application of another,
without affording the owner notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to
the taking. In demonstrating in some detail why the Sniadach-Fuentes rules
were inapplicable to the condemnation of property by eminent domain
proceedings, the Joiner court stated, in a per curiam opinion, that:
30. Highway Comm'n v. Thornton, 271 N.C. 227, 156 S.E.2d 248 (1967).
31. See Highway Comm'n v. Batts, n.29 supra.
32. See 52 Am. Jur., Trespass, Sec. 41 (1944).
33. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-108 (1974); Caperonis v. Highway Comm'n, 260 N.C. 587,
133 S.E.2d 464 (1963).
34. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-11 (1976); Rule applied in Virginia Electric and Power Co. v.
King, 259 N.C. 219, 130 S.E.2d 318 (1963).
35. See City of Charlotte v. Robinson, 2 N.C. App. 429, 163 S.E.2d 284 (1968).
36. 419 U.S. 1042 (1974), affirming 380 F. Supp. 754 (N.D. Tex. 1974), rehearing denied 419
U.S. 1132 (1975).
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It is now firmly established that the legislature may authorize a
municipal corporation to take, for public use, at the outset, the
absolute title to specific private property, if either the statute under
which that is done, or a general statute, recognizes the absolute right
of the owner, upon his property being taken, to just or reasonable
compensation therefor, and makes provision, in the event of the
disagreement of the parties for the ascertainment, by suit, without
unreasonable delay or risk to the owner, of the compensation to
which under the constitution he is entitled . . .37
Unlike debtor-creditor contractual arrangements, as in Fuentes, no balanc-
ing of interests is required in exercise of the power of eminent domain, "for
the power has only two restrictions: that the condemnation be for a public
purpose and that just compensation be paid." 38
Having fully disposed of the procedural question, the court indicated an
appreciation for the defendant's assertion that Texas eminent domain laws-
much like those of North Carolina-were "geared to fit a statutory scheme
designed for a rural . . .society to the realities of modern, urban civiliza-
tion. "39 Though compelled to steer clear of "legislative and programmatic
decision-making," 40 the court opined:
It might well be . . . that given the realities of modern decision-
making, the condemning authority ought to ask for, listen to, and
cautiously weigh the opinions of affected property owners before
commencing condemnation proceedings. Moreover, today's proper-
ty owners as a class are better able to participate intelligently in the
decision-making process. Not only do they have access to govern-
ment assistance programs which will enable them to propose and
articulate viable alternatives to a suggested project, but they also
have the ability to present a new dimension to a discussion that has
far too long been dominated by panjandrums representing a select
elite.41
No matter now sympathetic the Joiner court was to the defendant's claim, it
was not constitutionally empowered to write a model eminent domain code,
even if predisposed to do so. The standard against which the Texas statutes
were measured, and to which the court was constrained to adhere, was
provided by the United States Constitution and not that supplied by legisla-
tive reformers.
In light of the foregoing principles and case holdings, and considering the
availability of collateral proceedings to determine such questions as the right
and expedience of a taking, Chapter 506 raises no significant due process
problem. This is so even though the condemnor's acquisition of the right to
37. Joiner v. City of Dallas, 380 F.Supp. 754, 772 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
38. Id. at 774.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 779.
8
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title and possession accrues prior to adjudication of the right of condemna-
tion, of necessity for condemnation or of the amount to be paid.
Does Chapter 506 contravene the North Carolina Constitution in any
respect? Article I Section 19 of the North Carolina Constitution protects any
person from being disseized of his property except "by law of the land."
42
The "law of the land" is equivalent to "due process of law." 43 The effect
of the provision is to require that the owner of condemned property be given
reasonable notice, and a fair opportunity to be heard, when compensation is
fixed. It is not necessary that he be heard as to the necessity for, or proper
extent of, condemnation; that question residing within the legislative discre-
tion.44 Thus, it appears by satisfying the requirements of fourteenth amend-
ment due process, Chapter 506 simultaneously meets the requirements of
the North Carolina Constitution.
OTHER N.C. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
Conspicuously noted in the Manson appellate brief, is the assertion of a
violation of Article II Section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution. This
section prohibits the North Carolina General Assembly from enacting any
local, private, or special legislation regulating specified subject matters
therein enumerated.45 Chapter 506 is clearly a "local" act; it applies only to
the City of Durham. A statute applicable to a single city, without reasonable
distinction between such city and other cities or towns for the purpose of
classification, is a local act. 6 In its enactment of Chapter 506 the General
Assembly offered no rationale or justification for availing to the City of
Durham the procedural provisions of Article 9 of Chapter 136, without
extending the same authority to other municipalities similarly situated.
North Carolina municipalities are authorized by general law to condemn
private property for the general spectrum of public purposes, including the
construction of public parks.47 Every city in the State of North Carolina is
given the power of condemnation, for any and all public purposes, by the
provisions of Chapter 160A 48 and Article I of Chapter 40.49 But, an act is
not invalid merely because it is local, unless it violates some constitutional
provision. 50
42. "No person shall be ... disseized of his freehold. or in any manner deprived
of his life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.
43. Rice v. Rigsby, 259 N.C. 506, 131 S.E.2d 469 (1963).
44. Highway Comm'n v. Young, 200 N.C. 603, 158 S.E. 91 (1931).
45. "The General Assembly shall not enact any local, private, or special act or resolution
(a) Relating to health, sanitation, and the abatement of nuisances; ... "
46. Garner v. City of Reidsville, 269 N.C. 581, 153 S.E.2d 139 (1967).
47. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-241(3) (1976).
48. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-241 (1976).
49. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 40-2(2) (1976).
50. State v. Smith, 265 N.C. 173, 143 S.E.2d 293 (1965).
9
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Legislative justification for having, in effect, different procedures for
similar condemnors condemning for identical purposes is obscured by its
enactment of Chapter 506. This is especially so since, had the classifiation
been based on rational difference of situation or condition of condemnors,
such classification would not have rendered Chapter 506 "local. "51 At first
blush, it does not appear the classification drawn by Chapter 506 is based on
a reasonable and tangible distinction between condemnors, nor does it
operate the same on all North Carolina municipalities under the same
conditions and circumstances. Whether mere administrative convenience
presents a rational difference of situation or condition, upon which to base a
classification of the sort raised by Chapter 506, is open to question. Other-
wise, Chapter 506 does not do violence to the North Carolina Constitution.
Article II Section 24 of the North Carolina Constitution provided the
Manson defendants still another provision from which to posit a constitu-
tional argument. The North Carolina General Assembly is prohibited by this
provision from enacting local legislation on, among other things, matters
relating to health. Chapter 506 purports to grant to the City of Durham
authority and procedure to condemn land for any and all public purposes.
But, whether or not Chapter 506 condemnations disaccord with a provision
of Article II Section 24 is not readily answerable, in view of the paucity of
judicial directives in this area.
The Manson defendants asserted, inter alia, that among the topics
proscribed by Article II Section 24 are local acts relating to health; that the
City of Durham condemned their property for the construction of a public
park, stating as its purpose the promotion of public convenience, welfare,
health (emphasis added), and general interest; and that because Chapter
506, as applied, relates to health (a prohibited subject), it is void under the
North Carolina Constitution.
52
The health clause of Article II Section 24 has been so interpreted as to lay
open to attack many measures invoking the police power, to regulate matters
only remotely connected with health. The standard recital, that action is
necessary to protect the public "health, safety and welfare," has brought an
act authorizing the creation of public housing authorities within the health
clause. 53
The City of Durham, in Manson, asserted that one of the public purposes
for which it acquired defendants' land was the health of its citizens. The
North Carolina case of Carringer v. Alverson ,54 tends to indicate that such a
recital of health, as a purpose for the exercise of condemnation authority
51. Highpoint Surplus Co. v. Pleasants, 264 N.C. 650, 142 S.E.2d 697 (1965).
52. Brief for Defendant-Appellants' Supplemental Brief at 4-7, City of Durham v. Manson,
21 N.C. App. 161, 204 S.E.2d 41 (1973).
53. State ex rel. Carringer v. Alverson, 254 N.C. 204, 118 S.E.2d 408 (1961).
54. Id.
10
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pursuant to Chapter 506, brings the Manson case within the health clause of
Article II Section 24.
Three years after Carringer was decided, in State v. Smith 55-the latest
decision construing "local acts'--the North Carolina Supreme Court said
that the fact that a statute is local and regulates a forbidden area does not
render it void, if the regulation of the forbidden area is merely incidental or
consequential.56 (Emphasis added) The court, in Hailey v. City of Winston-
Salem 57 held that an annexation act, which had the effect of enlarging a
school district defined by the city charter as being coterminous with the city
limits, was not prohibited by Article II Section 29 (now codified in Section
24). Enlargement of the school district was a "mere incident in the accom-
plishment of the primary purpose of the Legislature," 58 which was to annex
territory to the city.
The Hailey court seemingly adopts the rule that where the primary
objective of an act is not related to any of the categories of Article II Section
24, the fact that an "incidental purpose" falls within the constitutional
prohibitions does not invalidate the act.
Efforts to impose the rules of Hailey and Carrington upon the facts of
Manson promise certain confusion. As per Carrington, the mere citing of
"health" as a purpose of a Chapter 506 condemnation may bring the action
within the ambit of the health clause of Article II Section 24 of the North
Carolina Constitution, thereby rendering the local act void. Albeit, the
primary purpose of Chapter 506 is undoubtedly to facilitate the condemna-
tion process for the City of Durham, for all public purposes, the regulation
of health being merely incidental. Ergo, as per Hailey, the incidental
purpose of health regulation will not invalidate the local act. Responding to
this problem when raised in the Manson case, the North Carolina Court of
Appeals offered a bare and unsupported assertion that "no part of Section 24
prohibits the enactment of local legislation of the character such as that
which is now before us."' 59
It is clear, then, that the existing precedents contain no luminous guidance
for determining what is not a regulation of health by legislative act, and
leaves a determination of what is a regulation of health in limbo. The court
neither as offered a definition of health sufficient to form the basis for
extension by analogy nor articulated policies sufficient for analysis to
determine what objectives of government must be implemented uniformly
throughout the territorial extent of the state. 60
55. 265 N.C. 173, 143 S.E.2d 293 (1965).
56. See Duffy v. City of Greensboro, 186 N.C. 47, 120 S.E. 53 (1923) for application of this
rule.
57. 196 N.C. 17, 144 S.E. 377 (1928).
58. Hailey v. City of Winston-Salem, 196 N.C. 17, 144 S.E. 377 (1928).
59. City of Durham v. Manson, 21 N.C. App. 161, 168, 204 S.E.2d 41 (1973).
60. Ferrell, Local Legislation in the North Carolina General Assembly, 45 N.C.L. REv.
340, 401 (1967).
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CONCLUSION
It appears settled, then, that Chapter 506 presents no significant procedur-
al due process problems. Due process in condemnation proceedings does not
entitle the condemnee to a prior determination of the right to take, or the
proper extent of the taking, before title to and possession of condemned
property vests in the condemnor. Due process is afforded the property owner
if he is given the opportunity to be heard on the amount of damages he has
incurred by the taking-the propriety or extent of taking being purely
legislative determinations.
The infirmities of existing condemnation procedures available to
municipalities substantially inhere in the multiplicity of procedures to which
such condemnors have access. All North Carolina municipalities condemn
basically for similar purposes, and the condemnation procedure used should
be uniform for all. Local legislation granting authority to condemn for
special purposes should speak to just that, the authority to condemn, and not
to the procedure by which the authority is effectuated. Consistency and
uniformity are much needed characteristics of North Carolina condemnation
law; and it is to this end that the North Carolina Legislature should direct its
attention.
Seemingly, so long as health is not cited in a Chapter 506 condemnation,
for whatever reason, no other state constitutional problems arise. However,
a great service would be done for all North Carolina municipalities having
authority to use the provisions of Article 9 of Chapter 136, if North Carolina
courts would offer some dispositive reasoning, on the Article II Section 24
question raised in Manson, other than a bare and unsupported pronounce-
ment of the invalidity of the argument. Until such time, local condemnees
must formulate a definition of health by way of analogy to existing cases, no
matter how confusing, in order to assure at least a facsimile of uniformity
throughout the state.
CALVIN E. MURPHY
Article 50: Legislative Delegation to Private Agricultural Groups
In 1947, the North Carolina General Assembly declared that it was in the
interest of the public welfare, that North Carolina farmers, producing
livestock, poultry, field crops and other agricultural products, be permitted
and encouraged to act jointly and in cooperation with dealers of such
products, in promoting and stimulating, by advertising and other methods,
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